Does it signify morally whether intentional deception is carried out by lying or in a way that avoids lying, for example, by evasion or by being economical with the truth? The common view is that it does not. Whereas it is generally recognised that there is much to discuss regarding when intentional deception may be justified and why it is justified when it is, the method by which deception is achieved is often thought to be of no intrinsic moral significance.
Does it signify morally whether intentional deception is carried out by lying or in a way that avoids lying, for example, by evasion or by being economical with the truth? The common view is that it does not. Whereas it is generally recognised that there is much to discuss regarding when intentional deception may be justified and why it is justified when it is, the method by which deception is achieved is often thought to be of no intrinsic moral significance.
Recently, in this journal, David Bakhurst has taken issue with an earlier article by me in which I challenged the common view (2) . I argued that whereas we all have a strict duty not to lie, we are not all under a duty of this kind not to deceive intentionally in ways that do not involve lying. Professor Bakhurst disputes this claim and also my supporting argument concerning the wrongness of lying.
Briefly, I connected the wrongness of lying with the social need to preserve trust. I claimed that toleration of lying is generally destructive of trust and that toleration of other modes of intentional deception that do not involve lying need not be. Professor Bakhurst does not agree that lying deception is more destructive of trust than non-lying deception and, anyway, he rejects my trust-related explanation of 
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Truth-telling; trust, autonomy. the wrongness of lying. He prefers to explain its wrongness as an 'affront' to a person's dignity and autonomy. He sees no reason why methods of intentional deceit which do not involve lying should be deemed to lessen or avoid the affront.
Here I wish to clarify and defend my position, refining it (I hope) in Professor Bakhurst comments: 'Nothing about the example suggests that it would be worse for the locum to tell a bold-faced lie, than to deceive the patient some other way. Indeed the words Jackson offers the locum are lies: he certainly knows the case well enough to answer the patient's question' (4) .
Let us for the moment continue to concentrate on the conceptual issue. Whether or not morally the bold lie comes to the same thing, I still maintain, in line with my definition of lying, that the locum who answers evasively in the manner described here, need not be asserting any falsehood -though, of course, he intends to mislead. He intends to give the patient the impression that he does not know the answer though we may suppose he knows well enough. In short, the locum does not lie.
Professor Bakhurst proceeds to observe that in order to sustain the strategy of deliberate deception the locum may anyway eventually have to lie -for instance, if the patient puts the locum even more on the spot with pointed questions. Hence Professor Bakhurst declares that the endeavour to avoid lying by employing some non-lying form of intentional deception is 'as worthless in practice as it is dubious in theory' (4). But while I agree that the strategy I advocate may fail, I do not agree that if it does the locum 'has to' lie.
If I am right that everyone, doctors included, has a strict duty not to lie, then probably the locum would not be justified, if deception failed, to resort to lying. With benign intent, the locum would have tried to stall. If he were put on the spot he would then be obliged either to tell the truth or refuse to answer (which in the circumstances would probably be as revealing as telling and less benign).
The moral difference between deception and lying
The account which I have given of the conceptual difference between deception and lying settles nothing in respect of the moral significance of the distinction. Professor Bakhurst misrepresents what I take this to be. He takes me to be arguing that 'it is always morally preferable' to deceive in ways that avoid lying than to lie (4 The wrongness of lying and the innocence of deception If we are to go beyond the intuitive level of arguing from examples, we need to pursue the question why lying is wrong when it is and to consider the implications for (non-lying) deception. Briefly, Professor Bakhurst's answer to why lying is wrong is that it infringes people's rights of autonomy and of dignity -and he proceeds to argue that deception does so equally. My answer to why lying is wrong is that characteristically it endangers trust-and I maintain that deception does not do so equally.
The wrongness of lying
Because of the fragility of trust and the frequency of temptations to lie we need in order to preserve trust in society to uphold a firm rule against lying; a rule which has the effect of excluding lying from our con-sideration as a practical option. For those who adopt this firm rule the question whether or not a lie might be allowable in this or that particular case, for example where trust appears not to be endangered, simply does not arise. They come to consider each case that arises with their minds already made upsome procedures, for example lying, are just out of the question. That is the mind-set, so to speak, of honest characters.
To be sure some flexibility may be built into the rule (though just how is something I pass over hereit deserves separate treatment). At any rate, however modified, the rule must be kept sufficiently strict so as nearly always to foreclose lying as an option. While I agree with Professor Bakhurst that some lies do not, and many non-lying forms of deception do undermine trust, I still maintain that lies characteristically, as non-lying deceptions do not, undermine trust.
Innocence of deception
A teaching which placed lying and deception on the same footing would, I believe, be inadequate for the preservation of trust -it would inevitably allow us too much discretion over when to lie and when not to. Yet to insist generally on the same strict rule against giving a false impression as against lying would be unreasonable. There are all sorts of situations, aside from trivial instances of polite hypocrisy in which legitimately we set out to give one another a false impression, for example when being interviewed for a job or in seeking to make friends with a new acquaintance. Quite generally we arewont to 'put on a front' in our dealings with one another.
To be sure there are circumstances in which we must not do so, where we have obligations to endeavour to give a full and accurate impression, for example the obligation in communication to our insurers to inform in 'utmost good faith' or, to cite Professor Bakhurst's example, the obligation to avoid giving a false impression when seeking consent from patients for surgery (4).
THE SECOND OBJECTION
Professor Bakhurst proceeds to argue that if doctors' duty not to lie turned upon the necessity to maintain trust, doctors would be absolved from such a duty in a society in which paternalisticmotivated deception were the norm; accepted, even welcomed, by patients. ' In such a society the relation between doctor and patient may be premised on the assumption that the doctor will protect the patient not only from illness but also from the cruel truth' (5).
Admittedly, if in such a society lying as well as other forms of deception were the norm, it would in one sense of 'reasonable' be only reasonable to expect to be lied to. But in another sense of 'reasonable' it is reasonable to expect whatever one has a right to. If one has a right not to be lied to, that right does not cease to exist merely because it is regularly violated.
To be sure, in some societies doctors may be expected as a matter of duty to protect their patients from certain cruel truths. Patients, it may be said, have a right not to know. Even so, the duty to protect patients from cruel truths need not be assumed in such societies to legitimate lying just because it legitimates using other forms of deception. In such a society honesty could still be acknowledged to 
Trust v autonomy
Finally, let us consider whether the wrongness of lying and of deception when it is wrong is better explained in relation to the preserving of trust, as I think, or in relation to respect for autonomy, as Professor Bakhurst thinks? I do agree with Professor Bakhurst that doctors' deceivings are indefensible where they happen to infringe patients' rights of autonomy. As we have already remarked, when consent is being sought for surgery, for example, patients have a right not to be deceived, even, if need be, to be undeceived, to be informed. Whenever doctors use deception to infringe their patients' rights of autonomy, they act dishonestly, they betray their patients' trust. Patients do, after all, reasonably expect, and are entitled to expect, their rights to be respected.
So far, so good. But are deceptions indefensible just when they infringe the right of autonomy of those being deceived? I think not. At least, they can involve betrayal of trust, where autonomy is not being interfered with. Patients sometimes lie to their doctors that they have been taking their medication as instructed: such lies betray trust but do not make any inroads on the doctors' autonomy -they do not interfere with the doctors' rights of self-determination, of being able to make important decisions concerning their own lives.
One reason why we are tempted to lie is in order to manipulate others into making choices we think appropriate (in which cases we may be interfering with their rights of self-determination). But that is only one among a variety of reasons why we might be tempted to lie. Doctors, for example, may lie to avoid embarrassment (to themselves, their patients, their colleagues) or they may lie to save time or they may lie to sustain hope. In providing a general explanation, then, of the wrongness of lying or of deception when that is wrong trust would seem to be a more promising candidate than autonomy.
Moreover, I suggest, whereas honesty is a universal moral virtue -in any society doctors have a duty not to lie and not to use deception to betray their patients' trust; the moral rights of autonomywho has these, under what conditions they apply, what duties correspond -is a more contingent culture-relative matter. It seems to me, therefore, wholly conceivable that there should be societies in which honest doctors practise benign deception on their patients quite regularly -as a matter of course.
But, to end on a note of agreement with Professor Bakhurst, in our own very autonomy-minded culture, the moral acceptability of doctors' deceivings depends very much on what degree of autonomy patients reasonably expect to exercise, and to be helped to exercise, when they go to their doctors.
